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SECT 37

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFO -- SECTION 1 OF 4
VICE SECTION 1 OF 3)

SUBJECT: KISSINGER SALT BACKGROUNTERS - PART TWO

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KISSINGER 1:00 A.M.
MAY 27 BACKGROUNDER ON SALT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

INTOLRIST HOTEL

1:00 A.M. MAY 26

MR. ZIEGLER: LET'S CONTINUE NOW WITH THE SESSION
WE BEGAN OVER AT THE EMBASSY EARLIER TONIGHT. DR. KISSINGER'S
REMARKS WILL BE ON THE RECORD.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE/CDC/MR	DATE 7/18/80
REVIEWED BY [Signature]	
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE	REASON(S)
TS AUTH.	ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
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WE ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF TYPING THE AGREEMENT. WE HOPE TO HAVE THAT READY FOR YOU AS SOON AS DR. KISSINGER IS FINISHED. WE HAVE HAD TO TYPE THAT FROM THE ORIGINALLY SIGNED DOCUMENT, BECAUSE THAT WAS THE ONLY COPY THAT WE HAD AVAILABLE.

BUT WE CAN PROCEED NOW. WE WILL GO RIGHT TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q. HENRY, FOR FACTUAL PURPOSES, I THINK IT WOULD HELP A GREAT DEAL HERE, SINCE WE DO NOT HAVE THE FIGURES AVAILABLE, COULD YOU GO INTO THE EXISTING FIGURES THAT ARE AVAILABLE? IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN THERE ARE FIGURES.

DR. KISSINGER: IN WHAT CATEGORY?

Q. WELL, I THINK BECAUSE THIS DOES CUT ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE AND ONE WILL BE LOOKING AT THE TOTAL FIGURES OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, EVEN THE BOMBER-DELIVERED WEAPONS WOULD HAVE RELEVANCE HERE.

DR. KISSINGER: FIRST, THE CURRENT FIGURES ARE THAT IN THE FIELD OF ICBMS THE UNITED STATES HAS 1,054 AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS ABOUT 1,600. IN THE SUBMARINE FIELD, THE UNITED STATES HAS ABOUT 656 AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS, AGAIN DEPENDING ON WHAT MISSILES YOU COUNT, SOMETHING BETWEEN 680 AND 700-PLUS. I WILL GO INTO THOSE FIGURES IN A MINUTE WHEN I EXPLAIN THE SUBMARINE AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN BUILDING MISSILES AT THE RATE OF SOMETHING LIKE 250 A YEAR. IF I GET ARRESTED HERE FOR ESPIONAGE, GENTLEMEN, WE WILL KNOW WHO IS TO BLAME.

Q. WHAT KIND OF MISSILES? DO YOU MEAN INTER-CONTINENTAL?

DR. KISSINGER: I AM TALKING ABOUT INTERCONTINENTAL, AND IT HAS BEEN BUILDING SUBMARINE MISSILES AT THE RATE OF 128 A YEAR. SO THIS IS THE BACKDROP AGAINST WHICH YOU HAVE TO ASSESS THE AGREEMENT.

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THEREFORE, ON ANY DAY YOU WOULD HAVE PICKED OVER THE LAST YEAR, OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, AND ON ANY DAY YOU STATE A SOVIET NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE. MOREOVER, IT WAS A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE THAT WAS GROWING, BECAUSE IN THE ICBM FIELD WE HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, NO ONGOING PROGRAM.

IN THE SUBMARINE FIELD, AS THE QUESTION INDICATED, TO WHICH I RESPONDED EARLIER, WE ALSO HAVE NO PROGRAM FOR MISSILES THAT WILL BE OPERATIONAL. IN THE SUBMARINE FIELD WE HAVE NOW NO SUBMARINE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THE FIRST SUBMARINE THAT WE HAVE THAT WOULD BECOME OPERATIONAL WOULD DO SO EARLY IN 1979 OR LATE IN 1978.

THEREFORE, ANY TIME OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WE WERE CONFRONTING A NUMERICAL MARGIN THAT WAS GROWING, AND A MARGIN, MOREOVER, WHICH WE COULD DO NOTHING TO REVERSE IN THAT FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. THEREFORE, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE FREEZE PERPETUATES A SOVIET NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IS BESIDE THE POINT.

THE QUESTION IS: WHAT WOULD THIS MARGIN HAVE BEEN WITHOUT THE FREEZE? THAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MARGIN.

SECOND: NOW, THEN, WHAT ARE THE FIGURES GOING TO BE? THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, GROSS OR NET -- IN OTHER WORDS, THEY WILL NOT GROW BEYOND 1,618.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBMARINES, WE HAVE DEVELOPED A VERY COMPLICATED FORM, AND I HAVE TO SPEND SOME TIME IN EXPLAINING IT TO YOU. IT MAY ALSO EXPLAIN WHY THERE WERE SO MANY NIGHT SESSIONS THIS WEEK HERE IN MOSCOW, FIRST BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV, AND THEN BETWEEN ME AND THE SOVIET DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SMIRNOV AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

BASICALLY, THE SOVIET SUBMARINES ARE FROZEN AT THE LEVEL THEY NOW HAVE. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY HAD AN ONGOING PROGRAM OF EIGHT SUBMARINES A YEAR, THEY ARE PERMITTED TO TRADE IN OLD MISSILES AND OLD SUBMARINES FOR NEW SUBMARINES UP TO A TOTAL LEVEL OF EITHER 62 SUBMARINES OR 950 MISSILES.

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Q. MAY I ASK A QUESTION THERE? WHEN YOU SAY THEY ARE FROZEN AT THE LEVEL, YOU MEAN OPERATIONAL AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION?

DR. KISSINGER: OPERATIONAL AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

Q. WHICH IS?

DR. KISSINGER: WHICH IS IN DISPUTE, FIRST BETWEEN OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, AND SECOND BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIETS. OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES GIVE US A CERTAIN RANGE. OVER A PERIOD OF A YEAR, THIS ALWAYS COMES OUT RIGHT, BECAUSE YOU CAN SEE THEM. BUT AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT, YOU CANNOT BE ABSOLUTELY SURE. THERE IS ALWAYS A SPREAD OF TWO OR THREE. AT ANY RATE, IT IS IN THE RANGE THAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE BRIEFING.

WHEN IT WAS ASKED AT THE BRIEFING, THOSE FIGURES WERE NOT FAR OFF. THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE MORE THAN THAT. AS I SAID AT THE BRIEFING, THE SOVIETS MAY NOT TELL US EXACTLY WHAT THEY HAVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO KNOW THAN WE, PAINFUL AS THIS IS TO ADMIT.

LET ME FINISH GOING THROUGH THESE NUMBERS. UNDER THE FORMULA THAT WE HAVE ADOPTED, THE SOVIET UNION CAN CONVERT 210 OLD ICBMS AND 30 OLD SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES INTO NEW SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES. IN OTHER WORDS, IN ORDER TO GET MORE SUBMARINES, THEY HAVE TO GIVE UP 240 OLD MISSILES -- OLDER MISSILES; STILL USEFUL, BUT OLDER MISSILES. THAT, IN EFFECT, IS THE ROUGH FORMULA.

NOW, THE FORMULA IS SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TWO TYPES OF SOVIET BOATS. ONE WITH 12 AND THE OTHER WITH 16 MISSILES. SO THE SOVIETS HAVE TO MAKE A CHOICE OF 62 OF FEWER MISSILES OR LESSER BOATS OF MORE MISSILES, BUT THAT IS A REFINEMENT INTO WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE TO GET IN DETAIL.

THIS IS THE SUBMARINE FORMULA. IT IS, IN SHORT, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE FROZEN AT A LEVEL OF WHAT IS CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

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THAT LEVEL HAD TO BE SOMEWHAT ARBITRARILY ESTABLISHED AS BETWEEN THEIR CLAIMS AND OUR ASSESSMENTS. AT ANY RATE, BEYOND THAT LEVEL, THEY HAVE TO TRADE IN ALL OLD MISSILES FOR NEW SUBMARINES UP TO A TOTAL CEILING THAT CANNOT EXCEED 62 SUBMARINES FOR 950 MISSILES. AGAIN, I ASK YOU TO REMEMBER THAT THAT LEVEL OF 62 SUBMARINES OVER THE PERIOD OF THE FREEZE MUST BE COMPARED WITH THE LEVEL OF 80 TO 90 SUBMARINES THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE FREEZE, IN WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE RETIREMENT OF THE 240 OLDER MISSILES ON TOP OF IT.

NOW, THIS IS ROUGHLY THE ARITHMETIC. DOES THAT ANSWER YOUR QUESTION?

Q. YES.

Q. I HAD A QUESTION ON THAT. WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF THE WORDS "UNDER CONSTRUCTION"?

DR. KISSINGER: WELL, SOME OF THE MOPE PROFOUND MINDS IN THE BUREAUCRACY, WHICH IS NOT NECESSARILY SAYING A GREAT DEAL, (LAUGHTER) HAVE ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE DEFINITION OF UNDER CONSTRUCTION THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IS WHEN THE HULL SECTIONS MOVE INTO THE SHED WHERE THEY ARE ASSEMBLED INTO A SUBMARINE. APPARENTLY THE SUBMARINE IS FIRST BUILT IN SECTIONS. IT IS THEN MOVED INTO AN ASSEMBLY PLANT AND AT THAT POINT THE SUBMARINE IS CONSIDERED UNDER CONSTRUCTION. AND THIS MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND WHAT THE SOVIETS TELL US THEY HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THAT IS TO SAY THEY MAY COUNT THE HULL SECTIONS AND WE COUNT THEM ONLY WHEN THEY ENTER THE SHED. THERE IS SOME TECHNICAL TERM FOR THE SHED, BUT AT ANY RATE WHERE THEY PUT IT TOGETHER.

Q. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THE ARBITRARY COMPROMISE LINE WAS YOU ESTABLISHED WITH THEM BETWEEN THESE TWO? WAS IT 45 OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT?

DR. KISSINGER: BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF THE FACT THAT SOME OF THE SOVIET BOATS HAVE 12 MISSILES AND SOME HAVE 16 MISSILES, THE SOVIET ARGUMENT WAS THAT THEY HAD

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48 SUBMARINES UNDER CONSTRUCTION WITH 768 MISSILES. OUR ASSESSMENT WAS LESS. THE FIGURE WE ADOPTED IS 710, IF YOU CONSIDER NEW MISSILES, AND 740 IF YOU ADD IN THE 30 OF THE OLDER MISSILES THAT THEY HAVE ON SUBMARINES.

IN EITHER EVENT, IF THEY WANT TO GET UP TO THE CEILING OF 950 MODERN SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILES, THEY HAVE TO RETIRE 30 OF THE OLD SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILES PLUS 210 OF THE ICBMS.

Q. THAT ARE INCLUDED IN THE 1618, IS THAT CORRECT?

DR. KISSINGER: THAT ARE INCLUDED IN THE 1618. IN OTHER WORDS, AS A RESULT OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS EXERCISE EVERY OPTION THEY HAVE UNDER THE AGREEMENT -- AND, OF COURSE, THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO EXERCISE IT -- BUT IF THEY EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM OPTION, THEN THE FIGURE WOULD BE REDUCED BY 210 AND WOULD BE 1408.

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Q. AND THE OTHER NUMBER WOULD BE 9507

DR. KISSINGER: YES. BUT, ACTUALLY, MAX, IF YOU DO THE ARITHMETIC, YOU CAN'T GET UP TO EXACTLY 950 BY ANY COMBINATION OF 16 AND 12 CALSS BOATS. I THINK THE MAXIMUM THEY CAN GET IS 944, BUT THAT IS A REFINEMENT WE DON'T HAVE TO GET INTO.

Q. WELL, THEY COULD KEEP SOME OF THE 30?

DR. KISSINGER: THEY CAN KEEP SOME OF THE 30. THEY CAN PIECE TOGETHER THE 950, BUT THEN THEY HAVE TO KEEP THE OLD MISSILES. THEY CANNOT COME UP WITH 950 HEW MISSILES FROM WHERE THEY ARE NOW UNDER ANY NEW ASSESSMENT.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, ISN'T THERE A GLOBAL FIGURE OF MISSILES THAT BOTH OF US ARE NOW OPERATING UNDER AND WE CAN HAVE ANY MIX WE CHOOSE?

DR. KISSINGER: NO, WE CANNOT HAVE ANY MIX WE CHOOSE. WE CAN AVE A MIX UP TO A CERTAIN CEILING IN SUBMARINES AND WE CAN RETIRE ONLY THE OLDER MISSILES. IT IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT TO TAKE NEW MISSILES AND TURN THEM INTO SUBMARINE MISSILES.

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IN OTHER WORDS, THEY CANNOT SIMPLY SHIFT SS11S INTO SUBMARINES ANY MORE THAN WE CAN TURN MINUTEMEN INTO SUBMARINES. UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONVERT 54 TITANS INTO THREE SUBMARINES. THE MISSILES BUILT BEFORE 1964 CAN BE CONVERTED INTO SUBMARINES WHICH GIVES US THREE AND IT GIVES THEM A LARGER NUMBER, BUT IN ANY EVENT THERE IS A GLOBAL FIGURE.

YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT. THERE IS A GLOBAL FIGURE WITH A CERTAIN FREEDOM TO MIX, NOT A TOTAL FREEDOM TO MIX BUT A CERTAIN FREEDOM TO MIX.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, HOW MANY OF OUR SUBMARINE MISSILES ARE BEING MIRV'D AND HOW MANY OF THE MINUTEMEN ARE BEING MIRV'D?

DR. KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE NUMBER OF MINUTEMEN IS THAT IS BEING MIRV'D. OF THE SUBMARINES MY TROUBLE IS I KNOW THE NUMBER BUT I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT IS CLASSIFIED OR NOT.

Q. IT IS NOT.

DR. KISSINGER: IT IS NOT? WHAT IS IT THEN?

Q. YOU HAVE DEPLOYED EIGHT.

DR. KISSINGER: BUT YOU DON'T KNOW HOW MANY WE ARE CONVERTING.

Q. YOU ARE CONVERTING 31. (LAUGHTER.)

DR. KISSINGER: I THOUGHT ALL MY FORMER STAFF MEMBERS JOINED CANDIDATES. (LAUGHTER.)

THAT IS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT, BUT WHETHER THE SUBMARINE IS MIRV'D OR NOT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WHETHER IT COUNTS AGAINST THE TOTAL. WHAT COUNTS AGAINST THE TOTAL IS THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS, NOT THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON EACH LAUNCHER.

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SELF ABOUT THE FREEZE POINT, BUT I CANNOT SAY OFTEN ENOUGH THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING EIGHT SUBMARINES A YEAR FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE BREEZE, ASSUMING THEY DO NOT EXPAND THEIR PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. ON THAT BASIS, THE SOVIET UNION, IF IT CONTINUED TO BUILD WHAT IT IS CAPABLE OF BUILDING, COULD HAVE BETWEEN 80 AND 90 SUBMARINES AT THE END OF THE FREEZE PERIOD, PLUS 210 ICBMS, PLUS 30 SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES.

ANOTHER PROVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCIDENTALLY, IS THAT MISSILES ON SUBMARINES OTHER THAN NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES THAT ARE MODERNIZED ARE COUNTED AGAINST THE TOTAL OF 950. THOSE MISSILES, OF COURSE, WOULD BE OUTSIDE THE AGREEMENT ALTOGETHER.

THEREFORE, THE FIRST THING ONE HAS TO SAY IS THAT THE FREEZE, EVEN WITHOUT THE CONVERSION, IS DESIRED. WITH THE CONVERSION, IT RETIRES 240 SOVIET LAUNCHERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAVE TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION FAIRLY: THE 240 LAUNCHERS THAT ARE BEING RETIRED ARE LESS MODERN THAN THE 240 LAUNCHERS BY WHICH THEY ARE REPLACED.

THE ONLY THING YOU HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT IT WAS NOT IN OUR POWER TO STOP THOSE 240 NEW LAUNCHERS IN ANY EVENT. THEY ARE NOT BEING BUILT AS A RESULT OF THE FREEZE. THEY WERE BEING BUILT ANYWAY.

Q. A TECHNICAL QUESTION: OF THE OLD LAUNCHERS, THE ICBMS THEY RETIRED WOULD BE SS-7 AND -8?

DR. KISSINGER: THAT IS CORRECT.

Q. AND THE SUBMARINES, IF THEY DECIDED TO RETIRE THE OLD ONES, WOULD REPLACE WHAT?

DR. KISSINGER: THIRTY TO THIRTY-SIX MISSILES ON THE H-CLASS SUBMARINES.

Q. HOW ABOUT THE G-CLASS?

DR. KISSINGER: THE G-CLASS SUBMARINES CAN BE RETIRED. IF THEY ARE MODERNIZED, THEY ARE COUNTED AGAINST THE

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Q• HAS THERE BEEN AN AGREEMENT ON TIME AND PLACE
FOR RESUMPTION OF A NEW ROUND OF SALT?

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DR. KISSINGER: THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN AN AGREEMENT,
BUT WE EXPECT IT TO BE WITHIN THIS YEAR.

Q. SOMETIME THIS YEAR?

DR. KISSINGER: YES. WE DO NOT EXPECT THERE TO BE
A VERY LONG INTERVAL. WE THINK WE HAVE THE MOMENTUM NOW.
WE CONSIDER THIS, AS I SAID IN MY OPENING REMARKS, A LANDMARK
AGREEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AND IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMS RACE IT IS SOMETHING THAT ADMIN-
ISTRATIONS HAVE STRIVEN FOR FOR THE BETTER PART OF THE 1960S,
AND WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN GIVE US A BASIS TO MAKE VERY SIGNIFI-
CANT ADVANCES.

Q. AT THAT POINT, HENRY, WHAT ABOUT REOPENING THE
QUESTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY?

DR. KISSINGER: WE HAVE BEEN, IN PRINCIPLE, PREPARED
TO DO THIS. THE OBSTACLE HAS BEEN THE DEBATE ABOUT INSPECTION,
AND WE ARE WILLING TO RESTUDY THE ISSUE.

Q. DOES THIS PROHIBIT THEM FROM FURTHER TESTING
OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS?

DR. KISSINGER: NO, IT DOESN'T PROHIBIT THEM FROM

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TESTING, BUT INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION WOULD BE CONSIDERED CONTRARY TO THE TREATY, AND THERE IS A PROVISION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE TREATY.

Q. BUT IF THEY CONTINUE TO DEVELOP THEM -- WE KNOW THEY HAVE BEEN -- WHAT HAPPENS THEN?

DR. KISSINGER: IT IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE TREATY. WHAT IS CONTRARY TO THE TREATY IS TO USE AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM, AND THAT WOULD BE THE ISSUE. THERE IS NO WAY THEY COULD USE AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM WITHOUT, IN EFFECT, CAUSING US TO ARROGATE THE TREATY. I MEAN, IF THEY DID IT ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE -- I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL CASE.

Q. COULD YOU SAY WHAT WAS THE LAST HANG-UP THAT WAS SETTLED TODAY?

DR. KISSINGER: AS I TOLD YOU WHEN I MET WITH YOU IN SALZBURG, THERE WERE FOUR OR FIVE ISSUES THAT HAD BEEN UNSETTLED. THE PRESIDENT TOOK THOSE UP WITH MR. BREZHNEV ON TUESDAY. AS YOU REMEMBER, THERE WERE TWO SESSIONS LASTING WELL INTO THE NIGHT. THAT SETTLED TWO OF THEM. THERE WERE THEN TWO OTHER ISSUES THAT REMAINED TO BE SETTLED. ONE WAS A SOMEWHAT ESOTERIC TECHNICAL ONE. IT WAS ESOTERICALLY TECHNICAL ON ONE LEVEL, BUT IT HAD SOME SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS. THE SECOND ONE HAD TO DO WITH THE CALCULATION FROM WHICH WE DERIVED THE POINT AT WHICH THE TRADE-IN OF OLD MISSILES HAD TO OCCUR, WHAT THE NUMBER WAS THAT HAD TO BE TRADED IN TO GET UP TO THE CEILING, AND HOW YOU HANDLE THE PROBLEM OF THE G-CLASS SUBMARINES.

Q. WHEN WERE THOSE SETTLED?

DR. KISSINGER: THERE WAS ONE SESSION THAT LASTED UNTIL 4:00 O'CLOCK ON WEDNESDAY. THERE WAS ANOTHER SESSION THAT LASTED UNTIL 3:00 O'CLOCK LAST NIGHT. THIS MORNING AT 11:30, AT A MEETING, THOSE TWO ISSUES WERE SETTLED. SO AT 3:00 O'CLOCK IT LOOKED AS IF WE WOULD HAVE TO DO AT LEAST ANOTHER DAY OR TWO OF WORK ON THESE TWO PROBLEMS, BUT THEN THIS MORNING WE HAD A MEETING AT 11:30 AND IT BEGAN TO BREAK. BY NOON I CALLED RON AND TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS BEGINNING TO

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BREAK, AND AT 1:00 WE HAD IT SETTLED.

THEN THE PROBLEM WAS TO GET THE AGREEMENT DRAFTED, AND I THINK IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS THAT JOINT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT TO TWO DELEGATIONS, SO THAT NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS COULD OCCUR, AND WHERE WE WERE KEPT INFORMED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ABOUT MEETINGS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN ORDER TO SPEED UP THE DRAFTING PROCESS.

THEN THE DELEGATION FLEW HERE IN THE AMERICAN DELEGATION'S PLANE AND ARRIVED ABOUT 9:00 O'CLOCK WITH THE TREATY DRAFT IN THEIR HANDS, BECAUSE THE DECISIONS THAT WERE MADE AT 1:00 STILL HAD TO BE PUT INTO TREATY LANGUAGE.

ALL WE DID THIS MORNING WAS TO ARRIVE AT THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK. THE DELEGATIONS THEN HAD TO PUT IT INTO LANGUAGE THAT WILL BE PUT BEFORE YOU SOON.

SO A TREMENDOUS AMNT OF WORK WAS DONE BY THE DELEGATION, AND IT SHOWED HOW RAPIDLY THINGS COULD MOVE IN DIPLOMACY WHEN BOTH SIDES WANT TO MOVE.

Q. WHO WAS AT THAT MEETING?

DR. KISSINGER: WHO WAS AT WHICH MEETING?

Q. AT THE MEETING AT WHICH THINGS BEGAN TO BREAK?

DR. KISSINGER: ON OUR SIDE IT WAS MYSELF AND SEVERAL STAFF MEMBERS. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, IT WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SMIRNOV, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DESK IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE, KOMINENKO, AND THOSE ARE ALL THE MEMBERS.

ON MY STAFF IT WAS MR. SONNENFELDT, MR. LORD AND MR. HYLAND.

Q. ONE CLARIFYING QUESTION ON THE SUBMARINE.
I BELIEVE THE PUBLIC RECORD SHOWS IT WAS THE UNITED STATES WHO PRESSED PUBLICLY FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE SUBMARINES ---

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DR. KISSINGER: THAT IS CORRECT.

Q. SECRETARY LAIRD SAID HE WOULDN'T FAVOR A TREATY UNLESS SURMARINES WERE INCLUDED.

DR. KISSINGER: THAT IS CORRECT.

Q. SO THEREFORE, THE IDEA THAT THE UNITED STATES GOT STUCK WITH A SURMARINE DEAL ---

DR. KISSINGER: THAT IS AN ABSURDITY. IT IS A TOTAL ABSURDITY. IT WAS THE UNITED STATES WHICH INSISTED THAT THE SUBMARINES BE INCLUDED. THE UNITED STATES WAS IN A RATHER COMPLEX POSITION TO RECOMMEND A SUBMARINE DEAL SINCE WE WERE NOT BUILDING ANY AND THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING EIGHT OR NINE A YEAR, WHICH ISN'T THE MOST BRILLIANT BARGAINING POSITION I WOULD RECOMMEND PEOPLE TO FIND THEMSELVES IN.

THEREFORE, WE DEVELOPED A FORMULA BY WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD TRADE IN SOME OF THEIR OLDER MISSILES FOR SURMARINES AS LONG AS THEY AGREED TO PUT A CEILING ON THE TOTAL CONSTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES. WE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BOTH IN TERMS OF WHAT COULD BE DONE WITH A RAPID AMERICAN SUBMARINE PROGRAM, AND IN TERMS OF THE COMPLETE PROPOSAL THAT EMERGED. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE SUPPORTED THIS PROPOSAL AND I DO NOT THINK THEY ARE THE MOST DOVISH MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT.

SO THIS IS NOT SOMETHING THAT THE SOVIETS FORCED ON US. IT IS SOMETHING THAT WE URGED ON THE SOVIETS IN A FIELD IN WHICH WE WERE NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES GOING TO BUILD A SUBMARINE BEFORE 1979, AND THEY HAD AN ON-GOING PROGRAM. SO I CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THERE WERE SEVERAL MEETINGS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE THIS WEEK.

Q. WHAT MANNER OF VERIFICATION CAN BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST SURMARINE NUMBERS?

DR. KISSINGER: AS SOME OF YOU KNOW, WE STARTED THIS WHOLE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, TO THE DISMAY OF SOME OF YOU VERY SLOWLY, BECAUSE WE SPENT SIX MONTHS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT

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MAKING THE MOST PAINSTAKING STUDY OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF VERIFICATION, AND BEFORE WE AGREED TO FORMULATE ANY PROPOSITION, WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF VERIFICATION WERE, WHAT THE MARGIN OF ERROR WAS, WHAT COUNTER-MEASURES WE COULD TAKE IF WE DETECTED VIOLATIONS, AND WHAT RISKS WE WERE RUNNING AT EACH LEVEL.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT ONE OR TWO SUBMARINES MIGHT NOT SLIP THROUGH, ALTHOUGH WE DON'T THINK SO. WHAT IT DOES MEAN IS I WOULD SAY IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BUILD SUBMARINES OF A NUMBER SUFFICIENT TO UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT OUR KNOWING IT AND PARTICULARLY IF YOU CONSIDER WHAT THE RISKS OF DETECTION WOULD REPRESENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

SO WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN DO THIS BY NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION. BUT I MUST SAY ALSO THAT I CAN'T CONCEIVE OF A COUNTRY ENTERING AN AGREEMENT OF FREEZE IN ORDER TO CHEAT, GIVEN PRESENT NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION.

Q. ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THIS AGREEMENT CAN BE SOLD TO THE SENATE, AND HAVE YOU BEEN GIVING SOME CONSULTATION TO PEOPLE LIKE JOHN STENNIS AND OTHERS?

DR. DISSINGER: YES, WE HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH KEY SENATORS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE SENATE, ONCE IT RECOGNIZES THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, THE LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND ITS CHARACTER, WILL VOTE FOR IT.

I DO NOT DENY THAT THE INITIAL REACTION OF SOME PEOPLE WILL BE TO LOOK AT THE GAP IN NUMBERS. BUT ONCE THEY UNDERSTAND THE CONSIDERATION I PUT BEFORE YOU, THAT IS TO SAY THAT THE GAP WOULD BE WITHOUT THIS AGREEMENT, AND THE FACT THAT THIS AGREEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME BRINGS AGREED REDUCTIONS IN THE MISSILE FORCES OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, I BELIEVE THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO EXPRESS SOME HESITATION WILL COME AROUND. WE EXPECT OVERWHELMING PASSAGE.

Q. MAY I FOLLOW BY ASKING ARE THE JOINT CHIEFS UNANIMOUSLY IN SUPPORT OF IT?

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DR. KISSINGER: THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL WE PUT FORWARD LAST NIGHT AND WHICH WAS ACCEPTED THIS MORNING.

Q. I THINK MY QUESTION HAS BEEN PARTIALLY ANSWERED. I BELIEVE ALL YOUR FIGURES, BUT WHO IS GOING TO CHECK INTO ALL THIS AND WHAT KIND OF INSPECTION ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE?

DR. KISSINGER: THE INSPECTION OF THE SYSTEM IS THROUGH NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION. IN OTHER WORDS, EACH SIDE WILL HAVE TO CHECK THE OTHER BY ITS OWN NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION, AND WE ARE HIGHLY CONFIDENT OF THOSE.

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DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03
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Q. DR. KISSINGER, AMBASSADOR SMITH RAISED
THE POINT OF THIS BEING THE FIRST TIME WHERE EACH SIDE
HAS ACKNOWLEDGED OR DELIBERATELY ALLOWED ITSELF TO REMAIN
VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY THE OTHER SIDE AND TALKED ABOUT
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS.

I WONDER IF YOU COULD ADDRESS YOURSELF TO THAT?

DR. KISSINGER: WELL, TO THE EXTENT THAT NEITHER
SIDE IS BUILDING A TERRITORIAL DEFENSE, IT IS, OF COURSE,
VULNERABLE, AND THE THE EXTENT THAT NEIGHER SIDE CAN DESTROY
THE RETALIATORY FORCE OF ITS OPPENT ENOUGH TO PREVENT A
COUNTER-ATTACK ON ITS POPULATION, IT REMAINS VULNERABLE.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARE WHAT THEY HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS, BECAUSE BOTH SIDES ARE NOW
VULNERABLE TO EACH OTHER, AND, THEREFORE, THE SIMPLISTIC NOTION
OF THE EARLY 1960S WHICH MEASURED DETERRENT BY THE AMOUNT OF
CIVILIAN CARNAGE THAT COULD BE INFLICTED BY ONE SIDE ON THE
OTHER WERE ALWAYS WRONG; HENCE, TO CONSIDER THE MASS USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TERMS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN
POPULATIONS, ONE FACES A POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY, NOT TO
SPEAK OF A MORAL IMPOSSIBILITY.

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BUT THIS HAS BEEN A FACT, NOW, FOR FIVE OR SIX YEARS.

Q WILL THE SALT MACHINERY BE KEPT IN PLACE FOR CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS AND IF NOT, WHAT WILL BE THE CASE?

DR. KISSINGER: OF COURSE, WE HAVE NOW DEVELOPED WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE A RATHER GOOD SYSTEM FOR CONDUCTING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS TO SAY, WE HAVE AN EXTREMELY ABLE DELEGATION, AND VERY ABLE NEGOTIATOR WHO CONDUCTS THE ORDINARY BUSINESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE IN WASHINGTON A SERIES OF COMMITTEES THAT MAKE THE TECHNICAL STUDIES AND THAT BACK UP THE NEGOTIATOR.

OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED A DEADLOCK, WE HAVE USED THE MECHANISM OF PRESIDENTIAL EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK, IN EACH CASE BY COMPROMISE THAT TURNED OUT TO BE FAIR TO BOTH SIDES, AND I THINK, HAVING DONE THIS NOW -- AND I MUST SAY AGAIN THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS WEEK CONFIRMS IT -- THAT WE CAN TALK TO EACH OTHER NOW IN A WAY THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE FIVE YEARS AGO, AND IN A WAY IN WHICH FEW COUNTRIES CAN TALK TO EACH OTHER NOW, BECAUSE MANY OF THEM DON'T HAVE THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE.

SO WHEN YOU TALK TO EACH OTHER ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILE SYSTEMS, WHEN YOU HAVE THE SORT OF CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD TO HAVE THIS WEEK IN ASSESSING WHAT MISSILES SHOULD BE COUNTED, A DEGREE OF, IF NOT POLITICAL CONFIDENCE, AT LEAST CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER'S METHODS OF LOOKING AT IT DEVELOPS THAT GIVES ONE SOME HOPE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CONTINUED IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK.

NOW, WHETHER WE WILL CONTINUE ALTERNATING BETWEEN HELSINKI AND VIENNA, OR WHETHER WE WILL CHOOSE A PERMANENT PLACE IN WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO ON, THAT, FRANKLY, HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED YET. BUT WE, ON OUR SIDE AT LEAST, ARE VERY TEMPTED AND INCLINED TO CONTINUE THE PROCEDURES THAT HAVE BROUGHT US TO THIS POINT.

Q CAN YOU TELL US IF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PERSONAL LEVEL BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION THIS WEEK ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE ALSO PRODUCED SOME

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PROGRESS IN SOLVING OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS , IN PARTICULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. I WILL NOT GO INTO OTHER TOPICS, BUT I WILL SAY THAT ALL TOPICS THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE SAME FRANKNESS. NOT ALL OF THEM ARE AS AMENABLE TO BILATERAL SOLUTION AS THE ONE WE HAVE DISCUSSED, BUT WE HAVE HAD VERY FRANK AND VERY THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS.

Q WHAT WERE THE TWO ISSUES THAT THE PRESIDENT SETTLED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS ON TUESDAY NIGHT? DID THEY CONCERN THE SUBMARINE ISSUE AS WELL?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. ONE OF THEM HAD TO DO WITH ABM SYSTEMS. I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO IT IN ANY MORE DETAIL.

Q WHAT IS THE OTHER ONE?

DR. KISSINGER: THE OTHER ONE INVOLVED THE DISCUSSION OF MOBILE MISSILES.

Q WHAT IS LEFT ON THE AGENDA NOW FOR SUBSTANTIVE WORK BY THE LEADERS? ARE THEY DONE NOW OR IS THERE MORE?

DR. KISSINGER: WELL, THEY HAVE COVERED BY NOW ALMOST EVERY TOPIC OF SIGNIFICANCE THAT AFFECTS OUR TWO COUNTRIES , AND, OF COURSE, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS GOING ON. AS YOU KNOW, SECRETARY ROGERS HAS BEEN HAVING A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS , AND I HAVE BEEN HAVING A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS, IN PARALLEL.

SO THE LEADERS WILL OFTEN SET A GENERAL FRAMEWORK WITH IS THEN BEING PURSUED BY OTHERS.

IN GENERAL , I WOULD SAY ALL TOPICS OF SIGNIFICANCE HAVE BEEN COVERED, BUT IT IS ENVISAGED THAT THERE WILL BE ONE OR TWO MORE WRAPUP SESSIONS BEFORE THE MEETING BREAKS UP.

Q HENRY, WHAT THE UNITED STATES OPPOSED TO ON-SITE INSPECTION?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

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WE ASKED FOR ON - SITE INSPECTION. ONE HAD TO DO WITH MIRV'S WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT. THE OTHER HAD TO DO WITH THE ABM SYSTEM. ONCE WE ANALYZED THE MECHANISM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION, WE FOUND WHAT JERRY SMITH POINTED OUT, THAT THE CAPABILITY OF CHEATING AGAINST ON-SITE INSPECTION IS VERY GREAT, AND THE NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION ARE MORE RELIABLE FOR THE KIND OF AGREEMENT WE HAVE MADE HERE.

I AM NOT SAYING AS WE GET FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD WITH MORE ESOTERIC PROBLEMS -- PARTICULARLY AS WE ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE-- THAT WE MAY NOT FIND SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION MAY PROVE NECESSARY. BUT FOR THIS AGREEMENT, WE REALLY FELT THAT WE WERE BETTER OFF WITH NATIONAL MEANS, AND IN ALL THE STUDIES OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL IN 1969, THIS CONCLUSION WAS CONFIRMED.

TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, THERE WAS NEVER A CASE IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ASKED FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AND WE REFUSED IT.

Q WHY WERE THEY OPPOSED TO ON-SITE INSPECTION?

DR. KISSINGER: IT HAS BEEN A FIRM SOVIET POSITION IN EVERY ARMENT NEGOTIATION IN THE POST WAR PERIOD THAT ON -SITE INSPECTION IS TOO INTRUSIVE, AND IT HAS, THEREFORE, GENERALLY BEEN RESISTED, AND IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE WAS ACCEPTED, SUCH AS THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN, IT WAS ACCEPTED WITH SO MANY RESTRICTIONS THAT ITS ACTUAL OPERATION MADE IT VERY EASY TO DEFEAT.

Q DR. KISSINGER , ON THE MIRV , AREN'T WE REALLY, BY DEPLOYING MIRV'S OURSELVES SO RAPIDLY, KIND OF FORCING THEM BY ENCOURAGING THEM INTO THEMIRV BUSINESS?

DR. KISSINGER: THIS IS A DEBATE THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THE ENTIRE POSTWAR PERIOD; NAMELY, WHETHER OUR TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE COMPELS THE SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE , OR WHETHER THE TWO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ARE NOT OCCURRING SOMEWHAT IN PARALLEL, AND ON THE WHOLE , THE SOVIET UNION WILL DO WHAT IT IS TECHNOLOGICALLY CAPABLE OF DOING. YOU REMEMBER THE DEBATE ABOUT THE HYDROGEN BOMB IN THE EARLY 1960'S IN WHICH ONE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE HYDROGEN

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BOMB WAS THAT IF WE DEVELOPED IT, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE FORCED INTO FOLLOWING SUIT. AS MATTERS DEVELOPED, WE EXPLODED OUR BOMB SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE SOVIET UNION DID, MAKING IT OBVIOUS THAT WE DID NOT LEAD THEM BUT THAT THEY WERE PURSUING A PARALLEL EVOLUTION.

I THINK IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE FIRST STEP TOWARD MIRV AT A TIME WHEN WE HAVE NOT YET DEPLOYED MIRV, AND I WOULD NOT, THEREFORE, ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU END (AT 1:45 A.M.)
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